Pragmatic naturalism and moral objectivity

Analysis 73 (3):446-455 (2013)

Authors
Victor Kumar
Boston University
Abstract
In Kitcher’s ‘pragmatic naturalism’ moral evolution consists in pragmatically motivated moral changes in response to practical difficulties in social life. No moral truths or facts exist that could serve as an ‘external’ measure for moral progress. We propose a psychologically realistic conception of moral objectivity consistent with this pragmatic naturalism yet alive to the familiar sense that moral progress has an objective basis that transcends convention and consensus in moral opinion, even when these are products of serious, extended and collaborative reflection
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DOI 10.1093/analys/ant058
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References found in this work BETA

A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.
The Ethical Project.Philip Kitcher - 2011 - Harvard University Press.
Moral Realism: A Defense.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):265-269.
After Objectivity: An Empirical Study of Moral Judgment.Shaun Nichols - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (1):3 – 26.

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Citations of this work BETA

Moral Judgment as a Natural Kind.Victor Kumar - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2887-2910.
Honor and Moral Revolution.Victor Kumar & Richmond Campbell - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (1):147-59.
Reflective Equilibrium and Moral Consistency Reasoning.Richmond Campbell - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):1-19.

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