Physicalism, supervenience, and dependence: A reply to Botterell

Dialogue 41 (1):163-167 (2002)

Authors
Neil Campbell
Wilfrid Laurier University
Abstract
Andrew Botterell has offered a fine response to my article, "Supervenience and Psycho-Physical Dependence". In my original article, I argued that Donald Davidson's brand of supervenience should be understood as a relation between predicates rather than properties, that this formulation captures a form of psycho-physical dependence that eludes other forms of supervenience, and that, as such, it might be useful to revisit Davidsonian supervenience as a means of expressing a plausible form of physicalism. Botterell's reply centres on offering support for the following two claims: that the distinction between properties and predicates "is irrelevant to issues concerning physicalism and supervenience" ; and that predicate supervenience is unhelpful to formulating a plausible form of physicalism. I think the first claim is false, but not for reasons that are readily apparent in the original article. My reaction to the second claim is more complicated.
Keywords Dependence  Metaphysics  Physicalism  Supervenience  Botterell, A
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DOI 10.1017/s0012217300013652
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References found in this work BETA

Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.), Essays on Actions and Events. Clarendon Press. pp. 207-224.
Supervenience as a Philosophical Concept.Jaegwon Kim - 1990 - Metaphilosophy 21 (1-2):1-27.
Mental Causation.Jaegwon Kim - 2002 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 170.
'Strong' and 'Global' Supervenience Revisited.Jaegwon Kim - 1987 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (December):315-26.

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