Putting thoughts to work: Concepts, stimulus-independence and the generality constraint
A venerable philosophical tradition claims that only language users possess concepts. But this makes conceptual thought out to be an implausibly rarified achievement. A more recent tradition, based in cognitive science, maintains that any creature who can systematically recombine its representational capacities thereby deploys concepts. But this makes conceptual thought implausibly widespread. I argue for a middle ground: it is sufficient for conceptual thought that one be able to entertain many of the thoughts produced by recombining one’s representational capacities, so long as one can do this apart from a direct confrontation with the represented states of affairs.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Putting Concepts to Work: Some Thoughts for the Twenty First Century.Jesse J. Prinz & A. Clark - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (1):57-69.
On Begging the Systematicity Question.Wayne A. Davis - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:399-404.
The Generality Constraint and Categorial Restrictions.Elisabeth Camp - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):209–231.
Words and Images: An Essay on the Origin of Ideas.Christopher Gauker - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
The Generality Constraint and the Structure of Thought.Jacob Beck - 2012 - Mind 121 (483):563-600.
Putting Thoughts to Work: Concepts, Systematicity, and Stimulus-Independence.Elisabeth Camp - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):275-311.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2009-01-28
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?
There are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.