Analysis 74 (1):ant102 (2014)
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In Radicalizing Enactivism, D. D. Hutto and E. Myin develop a theory of mind they call ‘Radical Enactive (or Embodied) Cognition’ (REC). They argue that extant enactivist and embodied theories of mind are, although pretty radical, not radical enough, because such theories buy into the representationalist doctrine that perceptual experience (along with other forms of ‘basic’ mentality) possesses representational content. REC denies this doctrine. It implies that perceptual experience lacks reference, truth conditions, accuracy conditions, or conditions of satisfaction. In this review I summarise their anti-representationalist argument and show that it has at least three major weaknesses.
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| DOI | 10.1093/analys/ant102 |
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References found in this work BETA
Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds.Shaun Nichols & Stephen P. Stich - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1984 - Behaviorism 14 (1):51-56.
View all 12 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Memory Without Content? Radical Enactivism and (Post)Causal Theories of Memory.Kourken Michaelian & André Sant’Anna - forthcoming - Synthese:1-29.
REC: Just Radical Enough.Erik Myin & Daniel D. Hutto - 2015 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 41 (1):61-71.
Introduction: Searching for the Natural Origins of Content: Challenging Research Project or Benighted Quest?Daniel D. Hutto & Glenda Satne - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):505-519.
Being Clear on Content - Commentary on Hutto and Satne.Dimitri Coelho Mollo - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):687-699.
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