Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds with Content By Daniel F. Hutto and Erik Myin

Analysis 74 (1):ant102 (2014)
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In Radicalizing Enactivism, D. D. Hutto and E. Myin develop a theory of mind they call ‘Radical Enactive (or Embodied) Cognition’ (REC). They argue that extant enactivist and embodied theories of mind are, although pretty radical, not radical enough, because such theories buy into the representationalist doctrine that perceptual experience (along with other forms of ‘basic’ mentality) possesses representational content. REC denies this doctrine. It implies that perceptual experience lacks reference, truth conditions, accuracy conditions, or conditions of satisfaction. In this review I summarise their anti-representationalist argument and show that it has at least three major weaknesses.



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Radicalizing Enactivism. Basic Minds without Content. [REVIEW]Glenda Satne - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (254):202-204.
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Douglas Ian Campbell
University of Canterbury