Reply to Nagasawa on the Inconsistency Objection to the Knowledge Argument

Erkenntnis 76 (1):137-145 (2012)
Authors
Neil Campbell
Wilfrid Laurier University
Abstract
Yujin Nagasawa has recently defended Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument from the “inconsistency objection.” The objection claims that the premises of the knowledge argument are inconsistent with qualia epiphenomenalism. Nagasawa defends Jackson by showing that the objection mistakenly assumes a causal theory of phenomenal knowledge. I argue that although this defense might succeed against two versions of the inconsistency objection, mine is unaffected by Nagasawa’s argument, in which case the inconsistency in the knowledge argument remains
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-011-9284-0
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References found in this work BETA

Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief.David J. Chalmers - 2003 - In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. pp. 220--72.
What Mary Didn't Know.Frank Jackson - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (May):291-5.

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Can Mary's Qualia Be Epiphenomenal?Daniel Lim & Wang Hao - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (3):503-512.

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