Analysis 81 (1):8-13 (2021)

Authors
Catrin Campbell-Moore
University of Bristol
Ben Levinstein
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Abstract
Considerations of accuracy – the epistemic good of having credences close to truth-values – have led to the justification of a host of epistemic norms. These arguments rely on specific ways of measuring accuracy. In particular, the accuracy measure should be strictly proper. However, the main argument for strict propriety supports only weak propriety. But strict propriety follows from weak propriety given strict truth directedness and additivity. So no further argument is necessary.
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anaa001
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References found in this work BETA

A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
Scoring Imprecise Credences: A Mildly Immodest Proposal.Conor Mayo-Wilson & Gregory Wheeler - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):55-78.
Conditionalization, Cogency, and Cognitive Value.Graham Oddie - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (4):533-541.

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