The conception of a person as a series of mental events


Abstract
It is argued that those who accept the psychological criterion of personal identity, such as Parfit and Shoemaker, should accept what I call the 'series' view of a person, according to which a person is a unified aggregate of mental events and states. As well as defending this view against objections, I argue that it allows the psychological theorist to avoid the two lives objection which the 'animalist' theorists have raised against it, an objection which causes great difficulties for the conception of a person that most psychological theorists favour, the constitution view. It is also argued that the series view allows that people can body swap and teleport, which the constitution view—which takes a person to be a physical object (but a distinct physical object from the human being)—has great trouble with
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00621.x
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.
Conditions of Personhood.Daniel C. Dennett - 1976 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press.
Sameness and Substance.David Wiggins - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Survival and Identity.David K. Lewis - 1976 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. pp. 17-40.

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Citations of this work BETA

Mereological Nominalism.Nikk Effingham - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Am I a Series?Jens Johansson - 2009 - Theoria 75 (3):196-205.

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Was I Ever a Fetus?Eric T. Olson - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):95-110.
Personal Identity and the Importance of One's Own Body: A Response to Derek Parfit.Kim Atkins - 2000 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (3):329 – 349.
Self and Body: Sydney Shoemaker.Sydney Shoemaker - 1999 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):287–306.
Am I a Series?Jens Johansson - 2009 - Theoria 75 (3):196-205.

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