The Grounds of Necessity

Philosophy Compass 5 (4):348-358 (2010)
Authors
Ross Cameron
University of Virginia
Abstract
Some truths are necessary, others could have been false. Why? What is the source of the distinction between the necessary and the contingent? What's so special about the necessary truths that account for their necessity? In this article, we look at some of the most promising accounts of the grounds of necessity: David Lewis' reduction of necessity to truth at all possible worlds; Kit Fine's reduction of necessity to essence; and accounts of necessity that take the distinction between the necessary and the contingent to be a matter of convention.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00296.x
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References found in this work BETA

New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
Essence and Modality.Kit Fine - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8:1-16.
Language, Truth and Logic.A. J. Ayer - 1936 - London: V. Gollancz.
Possible Worlds.John Divers - 2002 - Routledge.
Reductive Theories of Modality.Theodore Sider - 2003 - In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. pp. 180-208.

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