Logique Et Analyse 48 (189-192):43-56 (2005)
In this paper I examine two principles of orthodox truthmaker theory: truthmaker maximalism - the doctrine that every (contingent) truth has a truthmaker, and truthmaker necessitarianism - the doctrine that the existence of a truthmaker necessitates the truth of any proposition which it in fact makes true. I argue that maximalism should be rejected and that once it is we only have reason to hold a restricted form of necessitarianism
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Truthmaking and Grounding.Aaron M. Griffith - 2014 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (2):196-215.
Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology.Ross P. Cameron - 2008 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 62 (62):107-128.
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