Dialectica 60 (2):99–113 (2006)

Ross Cameron
University of Virginia
In this paper I examine whether the Humean denial of necessary connections between wholly distinct contingent existents poses problems for a theory of tropes. In section one I consider the substance-attribute theory of tropes. I distinguish first between three versions of the non-transferability of a trope from the substratum in which it inheres and then between two versions of the denial of necessary connections. I show that the most plausible combination of these views is consistent. In section two I consider an objection to the bundle theory using the Humean doctrine that is advanced by Armstrong, and argue that it is unconvincing. In section three I return to the version of non-transferability that would cause obvious trouble for a substance-attribute theory, and less obvious trouble for a bundle theory. I argue that there is independent reason to reject this principle since, given a perdurantist metaphysic, it does not in fact secure what appeared to be its only benefit: namely that it allows tropes to act as truthmakers. I conclude that there is no objection to trope theory per se on the grounds that it brings commitment to necessary connections.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2006.01050.x
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,066
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Truth and Truthmakers.D. M. Armstrong - 2004 - Cambridge University Press.
From an Ontological Point of View.John Heil - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
A World of States of Affairs.D. Armstrong - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7:429-440.

View all 13 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

What is Hume's Dictum, and Why Believe It?Jessica Wilson - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):595 - 637.
What is Hume’s Dictum, and Why Believe It?Jessica Wilson - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):595-637.
Non-Qualitative Properties.Sam Cowling - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (2):275-301.
The Deflationary Theory of Ontological Dependence.David Mark Kovacs - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272):481-502.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

If Tropes.Anna-Sofia Maurin - 2002 - Kluwer Academic Publishers.
The Causal Argument Against Natural Class Trope Nominalism.Douglas Ehring - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (2):179 - 190.
The Problem of Mental Causation and the Nature of Properties.S. C. Gibb - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):464-75.


Added to PP index

Total views
117 ( #98,658 of 2,498,775 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #422,193 of 2,498,775 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes