In Alex Byrne & David Hilbert (eds.), Readings on Color. MIT Press. pp. 177-90 (1997)
Physics tells us what is objectively there. It has no place for the colours of things. So colours are not objectively there. Hence, if there is such a thing at all, colour is mind-dependent. This argument forms the background to disputes over whether common sense makes a mistake about colours. It is assumed that..
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