What is Moral Judgment?

Journal of Philosophy 104 (7):321-349 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Moral knowledge appears to require moral judgments to be states of belief, yet they must at the same time be states of desire and feeling if they embody the motivation that we feel when we make moral judgments. How can the same judgment be a state of belief and a state of desire or feeling, simultaneously? [...] This problem may be resolved, I shall contend, by understanding moral judgments to be complex, multifunctional states that normally comprise both states of belief that represent possible moral truths and states of emotion and motivation.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 84,108

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Beyond moral judgment.Alice Crary - 2007 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Judgment, Deliberation, and the Self-effacement of Moral Theory.Damian Cox - 2012 - Journal of Value Inquiry 46 (3):289-302.
Hume's Views on Moral Judgment.Clark Gordon Thompson - 1991 - Dissertation, University of Virginia
Two kinds of moral relativism.John J. Tilley - 1995 - Journal of Value Inquiry 29 (2):187-192.
Causation in Moral Judgment.Michael Kurak - 2011 - Mind and Matter 9 (2):153-170.
Moral modesty, moral judgment and moral advice. A Wittgensteinian approach.Benjamin De Mesel - 2014 - International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 75 (1):20-37.
Psychopathy and internalism.Victor Kumar - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):318-345.


Added to PP

447 (#30,428)

6 months
11 (#101,970)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Moral judgment as a natural kind.Victor Kumar - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2887-2910.
Honor and Moral Revolution.Victor Kumar & Richmond Campbell - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (1):147-59.
Psychopathy and internalism.Victor Kumar - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):318-345.
The Empirical Identity of Moral Judgment.Victor Kumar - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):783-804.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references