Mind and Language 22 (5):548–562 (2007)

Authors
John H. Campbell
University of California, Los Angeles
Abstract
I set out two theses. The first is Lynn Robertson’s: (a) spatial awareness is a cause of object perception. A natural counterpoint is: (b) spatial awareness is a cause of your ability to make accurate verbal reports about a perceived object. Zenon Pylyshyn has criticized both. I argue that nonetheless, the burden of the evidence supports both (a) and (b). Finally, I argue conscious visual perception of an object has a different causal role to both: (i) non-conscious perception of the object, and (ii) experience, e.g. hallucination, that may be subjectively indiscriminable from, but is not, perception of the object.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2007.00320.x
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References found in this work BETA

Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
Making Things Happen. A Theory of Causal Explanation.Michael Strevens - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):233-249.

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Citations of this work BETA

Olfactory Objects.Felipe Carvalho - 2014 - Disputatio 6 (38):45-66.
Attentive Visual Reference.E. J. Green - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (1):3-38.

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