Biology and Philosophy 16 (3):357-375 (2001)
AbstractThomas Huxley is often identified as the originator of the doctrineknown as ``epiphenomenalism,'' but there appears to be littleappreciation for the details of Huxley's theory. In particular,conflicting interpretations show that there is uncertainty about twoaspects of his position: whether mental states are completelywithout causal powers or simply have no influence on the behavior theyare typically taken to explain, and whether conscious epiphenomena arethemselves physical states of the brain or immaterial items. I clarifythese issues and show that Huxley's brand of epiphenomenalism is in factdifferent from the forms usually attributed to him.
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Hughlings Jackson and the “doctrine of concomitance”: mind-brain theorising between metaphysics and the clinic.M. Chirimuuta - 2017 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 39 (3):26.
References found in this work
On the Hypothesis That Animals Are Automata, and its History.T. Huxley - 1874 - Fortnightly Review 95:555-80.
The Metaphysic of Experience.Shadworth H. Hodgson - 1899 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 48:505-515.