Why we should lower our expectations about the explanatory gap

Theoria 75 (1):34-51 (2009)
Abstract
I argue that the explanatory gap is generated by factors consistent with the view that qualia are physical properties. I begin by considering the most plausible current approach to this issue based on recent work by Valerie Hardcastle and Clyde Hardin. Although their account of the source of the explanatory gap and our potential to close it is attractive, I argue that it is too speculative and philosophically problematic. I then argue that the explanatory gap should not concern physicalists because it makes excessive demands on physical theory.
Keywords qualia  physicalism  mental anomalism  consciousness  explanatory gap  explanation
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2008.01027.x
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 32,628
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.

View all 30 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-02-24

Total downloads
197 ( #25,886 of 2,236,067 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #148,987 of 2,236,067 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature