Conditionals in reasoning

Synthese 171 (1):47 - 75 (2009)
Abstract
The paper presents a non-monotonic inference relation on a language containing a conditional that satisfies the Ramsey Test. The logic is a weakening of classical logic and preserves many of the ‘paradoxes of implication’ associated with the material implication. It is argued, however, that once one makes the proper distinction between supposing that something is the case and accepting that it is the case, these ‘paradoxes’ cease to be counterintuitive. A representation theorem is provided where conditionals are given a non-bivalent semantics and epistemic states are represented via preferential models.
Keywords Conditionals  Non-monotonic logic  Ramsey test
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-008-9379-6
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 28,756
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Elements of Intuitionism.Michael A. E. Dummett - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
On Conditionals.Dorothy Edgington - 1995 - Mind 104 (414):235-329.

View all 25 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Unity and Autonomy in Expressivist Logic.John Cantwell - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (3):443-457.
Constrained Consequence.Katarina Britz, Johannes Heidema & Ivan Varzinczak - 2011 - Logica Universalis 5 (2):327-350.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

85 ( #62,166 of 2,178,142 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #316,663 of 2,178,142 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums