Logics of belief change without linearity

Journal of Symbolic Logic 65 (4):1556-1575 (2000)
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Abstract

Ever since [4], systems of spheres have been considered to give an intuitive and elegant way to give a semantics for logics of theory- or belief- change. Several authors [5, 11] have considered giving up the rather strong assumption that systems of spheres be linearly ordered by inclusion. These more general structures are called hypertheories after [8]. It is shown that none of the proposed logics induced by these weaker structures are compact and thus cannot be given a strongly complete axiomatization in a finitary logic. Complete infinitary axiomatizations are given for several intuitive logics based on hypertheories that are not linearly ordered by inclusion

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John Cantwell
Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm

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References found in this work

Two modellings for theory change.Adam Grove - 1988 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (2):157-170.
Belief Revision From the Point of View of Doxastic Logic.Krister Segerberg - 1995 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 3 (4):535-553.
Preferential belief change using generalized epistemic entrenchment.Hans Rott - 1992 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 1 (1):45-78.
A model existence theorem in infinitary propositional modal logic.Krister Segerberg - 1994 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (4):337 - 367.
Some logics of iterated belief change.John Cantwell - 1999 - Studia Logica 63 (1):49-84.

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