Theoria 83 (2):154-168 (2017)

Authors
John Cantwell
Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm
Sten Lindström
Uppsala University
Wlodek Rabinowicz
Lund University
Abstract
Vann McGee has proposed a counterexample to the Ramsey Test. In the counterexample, a seemingly trustworthy source has testified that p and that if not-p, then q. If one subsequently learns not-p, then one has reason to doubt the trustworthiness of the source and so, the argument goes, one has reason to doubt the conditional asserted by the source. Since what one learns is that the antecedent of the conditional holds, these doubts are contrary to the Ramsey Test. We argue that the counterexample fails. It rests on a principle of testimonial dependence that is not applicable when a source hedges his or her claims.
Keywords Ramsey Test  conditionals  counterexample
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DOI 10.1111/theo.12115
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References found in this work BETA

Common Ground.Robert C. Stalnaker - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5-6):701-721.
Finkish Dispositions.David K. Lewis - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158.

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