Studia Logica 63 (1):49-84 (1999)

Authors
John Cantwell
Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm
Abstract
The problems that surround iterated contractions and expansions of beliefs are approached by studying hypertheories, a generalisation of Adam Grove's notion of systems of spheres. By using a language with dynamic and doxastic operators different ideas about the basic nature of belief change are axiomatised. It is shown that by imposing quite natural constraints on how hypertheories may change, the basic logics for belief change can be strengthened considerably to bring one closer to a theory of iterated belief change. It is then argued that the logic of expansion, in particular, cannot without loss of generality be strengthened any further to allow for a full logic of iterated belief change. To remedy this situation a notion of directed expansion is introduced that allows for a full logic of iterated belief change. The new operation is given an axiomatisation that is complete for linear hypertheories.
Keywords Philosophy   Logic   Mathematical Logic and Foundations   Computational Linguistics
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1005219504371
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 58,981
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Severe Withdrawal (and Recovery).Hans Rott & Maurice Pagnucco - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (5):501-547.
Iterated Belief Change and the Recovery Axiom.Samir Chopra, Aditya Ghose, Thomas Meyer & Ka-Shu Wong - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (5):501-520.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
33 ( #318,024 of 2,427,504 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #533,878 of 2,427,504 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes