The identity theory of truth

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008)
Authors
Stewart Candlish
University of Western Australia
Abstract
is true, there is a truth-maker (e.g., a fact) with which it is identical and the truth of the former consists in its identity with the latter. The theory is best understood as a reaction to the correspondence theory, according to which the relation of truth-bearer to truth-maker is correspondence. A correspondence theory is vulnerable to the nagging suspicion that if the best we can do is make statements that merely correspond to the truth, then we inevitably fail to capture the reality they are about and thus fall short of the truth we aim at. An identity theory is designed to overcome this suspicion.
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Propositional Attitudes?Trenton Merricks - 2009 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):207 - 232.
Truth in the Tractatus.Hans Johann Glock - 2006 - Synthese 148 (2):345 - 368.
Wherefore the Failure of Private Ostension?George Wrisley - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):483 - 498.

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