A coherent moral relativism

Synthese 166 (2):413 - 430 (2009)
Abstract
Moral relativism is an attractive position, but also one that it is difficult to formulate. In this paper, we propose an alternative way of formulating moral relativism that locates the relativity of morality in the property that makes moral claims true. Such an approach, we believe, has significant advantages over other possible ways of formulating moral relativism. We conclude by considering a few problems such a position might face.
Keywords Moral relativism  Alethic pluralism  Truth  Coherence
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Reprint years 2009
DOI 10.1007/s11229-007-9279-1
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References found in this work BETA
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
Relativism and Disagreement.John MacFarlane - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.
Change in View.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - MIT Press.
Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2005 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Expressivism and Plural Truth.Michael P. Lynch - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):385-401.
Relativized Propositions and the Fregean Orthodoxy.Iris Einheuser - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):590-603.

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