Benacerraf's revenge

Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):111-129 (2013)
Authors
Chris Tillman
University of Manitoba
Abstract
In a series of recent publications, Jeffrey King (The nature and structure of content, 2007; Proc Aristot Soc 109(3):257–277, 2009; Philos Stud, 2012) argues for a view on which propositions are facts. He also argues against views on which propositions are set-theoretical objects, in part because such views face Benacerraf problems. In this paper, we argue that, when it comes to Benacerraf problems, King’s view doesn’t fare any better than its set-theoretical rivals do. Finally, we argue that his view faces a further Benacerraf problem, one that threatens to undercut his explanation of why propositions have truth-conditions. If correct, our arguments undercut King’s main motivation for accepting his view over its rivals.
Keywords Metaphysics of propositions  Semantics  Unity of propositions
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-0064-8
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References found in this work BETA

Writing the Book of the World.Theodore Sider - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
The Nature and Structure of Content.Jeffrey C. King - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Putnam's Paradox.David Lewis - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):221 – 236.

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Citations of this work BETA

Arbitrary Reference, Numbers, and Propositions.Michele Palmira - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):1069-1085.
Not the Optimistic Type.Ben Caplan, Chris Tillman, Brian McLean & Adam Murray - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (5):575-589.
Recent Defenses of Descriptivism.Anthony Everett - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (1):103–139.
Why It Isn't Syntax That Unifies the Proposition.Logan Fletcher - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (5-6):590-611.

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