Can 'downward causation' save free will?

Philosophia 38 (1):131-142 (2010)
Abstract
Recently, Trenton Merricks has defended a libertarian view of human freedom. He claims that human persons have downward causal control of their constituent parts, and that downward causal control of this sort is sufficient for free will. In this paper I examine Merricks’s defense of free will, and argue that it is unsuccessful. I show that having downward causal control is not sufficient for for free will. In an Appendix I also argue that Merricks’s defense of free will, together with assumptions implicit in his broader ontology, commit him to the implausible conclusion that determinism is incompatible with the existence of human persons.
Keywords Trenton Merricks  Downward causation  Mental causation  Free will
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-009-9191-7
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Objects and Persons.Trenton Merricks - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
Moral Responsibility and Buffered Alternatives.David P. Hunt - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):126–145.

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