Topoi 36 (2):343-353 (2017)
AbstractSince its introduction, Hubert Dreyfus’ account of expertise has been a topic of debate and continues to be. This article focuses on one particular critique: Selinger and Crease :245–279, 2002) argument that Dreyfus wrongfully denies expertise to those whose expertise is a matter of propositional knowledge, which they call an ‘expert in x’. This article sets out to defend Dreyfus against the ‘expert in x’ by showing that Selinger and Crease’s use of Gilbert Ryle’s distinction between know-how and know-that as the foundation of their argument is vulnerable to Ryle’s regress argument and arguments from Radical Anti-Intellectualism.
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References found in this work
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1950 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 (4):328-332.
What Computers Still Can’T Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason.Hubert L. Dreyfus - 1992 - MIT Press.