Journal of Philosophical Research 43:113-124 (2018)
Abstract |
Laurie Paul has recently proposed that transformative experiences are a distinct challenge to our ability to make rational decisions about our futures. In response, many have claimed that the situation is not as bad as it seems and that it is possible to rationally choose to undergo a transformative experience. Here I argue that the situation is actually worse because the current debate has so far only been framed in terms of comparing a transformative experience to the familiar status quo. If we instead consider choices among transformative experiences—what I call a transformative selection—then transformative experiences continue to pose a significant challenge to our rational decision-making.
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Keywords | Contemporary Philosophy General Interest |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
ISBN(s) | 1053-8364 |
DOI | 10.5840/jpr2018717123 |
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