Freedom with Causation

Erkenntnis 82 (2):327-338 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Our actions have causes, some of which are beyond our control. Of that there can be no serious doubt. Some worry that this fact undermines the commonsense view that we perform free actions for which we are morally responsible. My aim in this article is to show that such worries are unfounded and, consequently, that pure non-causal theories of free action, according to which free actions must be entirely uncaused, are false. My argument for this conclusion doesn’t presuppose the cogency of existing objections to non-causal theories of free agency.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 94,659

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Power, Harmony, and Freedom: Debating Causation in 18th Century Germany.Corey Dyck - forthcoming - In Frederick Beiser, Corey W. Dyck & Brandon Look (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Eighteenth-Century German Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
Indirect Compatibilism.Andrew James Latham - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Sydney
Rolling back the Rollback Argument.László Bernáth & János Tőzsér - 2020 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 2 (39):43-61.
Living Without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Neuroscience, Free Will and Responsibility.Walter Glannon - 2009 - Journal of Ethics in Mental Health 4:1-6.
Goetz on the Noncausal Libertarian View of Free Will.David Palmer - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):99-107.


Added to PP

92 (#184,893)

6 months
9 (#456,657)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Justin A. Capes
Flagler College

References found in this work

An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.
Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will.Timothy O'Connor - 2000 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.

View all 23 references / Add more references