Oxford University Press UK (2012)

Authors
Herman Cappelen
University of Hong Kong
Abstract
The standard view of philosophical methodology is that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence. Herman Cappelen argues that this claim is false: it is not true that philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence. At worst, analytic philosophers are guilty of engaging in somewhat irresponsible use of 'intuition'-vocabulary. While this irresponsibility has had little effect on first order philosophy, it has fundamentally misled meta-philosophers: it has encouraged meta-philosophical pseudo-problems and misleading pictures of what philosophy is.
Keywords Methodology  Intuition  Evidence
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Reprint years 2012, 2013, 2014
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Call number BD241.C335 2012
ISBN(s) 9780198703020   0199644861   9780199644865   0198703023
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Chapters BETA
Intuitions in Philosophy: Overview and Taxonomy

The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence (Centrality) is widely accepted both in philosophical methodology or metaphilosophy and philosophy at large. This introductory chapter provides an overview and taxonomy of views about what intuitions are and w... see more

A Big Mistake: Experimental Philosophy

Experimental philosophers are right in thinking that if philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence, then we should attempt to find out whether philosophers’ intuitions are reliable, widely shared and subject to biases. It has, however, already been shown that philosophers do not in fact r... see more

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Citations of this work BETA

A Guided Tour Of Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics.David Plunkett & Herman Cappelen - 2020 - In Herman Cappelen, David Plunkett & Alexis Burgess (eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-26.
The Intellectual Given.John Bengson - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):707-760.
Conceptual Engineering, Truth, and Efficacy.Jennifer Nado - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1507-1527.

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