Relativism and Monadic Truth

Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. Edited by John Hawthorne (2009)
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Abstract

Cappelen and Hawthorne present a powerful critique of fashionable relativist accounts of truth, and the foundational ideas in semantics on which the new relativism draws. They argue compellingly that the contents of thought and talk are propositions that instantiate the fundamental monadic properties of truth and falsity

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2009-01-28

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Author Profiles

Herman Cappelen
University of Hong Kong
John Hawthorne
University of Southern California

Citations of this work

Mental Files.François Récanati - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Disagreements about taste.Timothy Sundell - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (2):267-288.
The Moving Spotlight Theory.Daniel Deasy - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2073-2089.
Embedding Epistemic Modals.Cian Dorr & John Hawthorne - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):867-914.

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