American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (4):337-50 (1999)
AbstractIn this paper, we consider the bearing intuitions have on semantic theory, and suggest that when the phenomenon is properly understood, they are less important than philosophers tend to think. We also argue that our conclusions go beyond intuitions about semantics, and impugn the idea of intuition more generally.
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