Soames’s new conception of propositions

Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2533-2549 (2016)

Authors
Benjamin Caplan
University of Kansas
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that, when it comes to explaining what can be described as “representational” properties of propositions, Soames’s new conception of propositions—on which the proposition that Seattle is sunny is the act of predicating the property being sunny of Seattle and to entertain that proposition is to perform that act—does not have an advantage over traditional ones.
Keywords Soames  Proposition  Representation  Grounding  Essence  Explanation
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-016-0633-3
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 43,999
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No Work for a Theory of Grounding.Jessica M. Wilson - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (5-6):535-579.
Grounding: Toward a Theory of the In-Virtue-Of Relation.Paul Audi - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (12):685-711.
Essence and Modality.Kit Fine - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8:1-16.
The Possibility of Physicalism.Shamik Dasgupta - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (9-10):557-592.
Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction.Gideon Rosen - 2010 - In Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 109-36.

View all 31 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Should Propositions Proliferate?Bjørn Jespersen - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (4):243-251.
Cognitive Propositions.Stephen Schiffer - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2551-2563.
Propositions and Attitudes.Nathan U. Salmon & Scott Soames (eds.) - 1988 - Oxford University Press.
The Propositions We Assert.Stavroula Glezakos - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (2):165-173.
Truth and Meaning Redux.Ernie Lepore & Kirk Ludwig - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (2):251-77.
Soames’s Deflationism About Modality.Tuomas E. Tahko - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (6):1367-1379.
Propositions: Individuation and Invirtuation.Kris McDaniel - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):757-768.
Propositional Attitudes and Mental Acts.Indrek Reiland - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):239-245.
Direct Reference and Singular Propositions.Matthew Davidson - 2000 - American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (3):285-300.
The Eternal Existence of True Propositions.Mark Steven Roberts - 1987 - Dissertation, University of Dallas

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-02-10

Total views
68 ( #120,952 of 2,266,718 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
11 ( #82,142 of 2,266,718 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature