Philosophical Studies 150 (1):61-77 (2010)

Justin A. Capes
Flagler College
There has been a great deal of critical discussion of Harry Frankfurt’s argument against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), almost all of which has focused on whether the Frankfurt-style examples, which are designed to be counterexamples to PAP, can be given a coherent formulation. Recently, however, David Widerker has argued that even if Frankfurt-style examples can be given a coherent formulation, there is reason to believe that an agent in those examples could never be morally blameworthy for what she has done. Therefore, such examples do not undermine a version of PAP restricted to blameworthiness. Widerker refers to his argument for this claim as the W-defense. I examine the W-defense in some detail, along with three recent replies to it by defenders of Frankfurt’s argument. I contend that each of these replies is problematic and, indeed, that two of them play directly into the hands of those seeking to defend PAP. I then develop my own reply to the W-defense by calling into question an assumption which is at the heart of that argument regarding the nature of moral blame.
Keywords Frankfurt  Alternative possibilities  W-defense  Moral responsibility  Blame  David Widerker
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-009-9397-3
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References found in this work BETA

Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases.Alfred R. Mele & David Robb - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (1):97-112.

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Citations of this work BETA

Blame and the Humean Theory of Motivation.Adam Thompson - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):1345-1364.
Capes on the W-Defense.David Palmer - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (2):555-566.
Los contraejemplos tipo-Frankfurt y un dilema para la "DEFENSA-W".Carlos G. Patarroyo G. - 2013 - Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Del Norte 19:56-80.

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