Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):374-397 (2017)

Authors
Boleslaw Czarnecki
University of Edinburgh
J. Adam Carter
University of Glasgow
Abstract
Anti-intellectualists about knowledge-how insist that, when an agent S knows how to φ, it is in virtue of some ability, rather than in virtue of any propositional attitudes, S has. Recently, a popular strategy for attacking the anti-intellectualist position proceeds by appealing to cases where an agent is claimed to possess a reliable ability to φ while nonetheless intuitively lacking knowledge-how to φ. John Bengson & Marc Moffett (2009; 2011a; 2011b) and Carlotta Pavese (2015a; 2015b) have embraced precisely this strategy and have thus claimed, for different reasons, that anti-intellectualism is defective on the grounds that possessing the ability to φ is not sufficient for knowing how to φ. We investigate this strategy of argument-by-counterexample to the anti- intellectualist’s sufficiency thesis and show that, at the end of the day, anti-intellectualism remains unscathed.
Keywords epistemology  knowledge-how  anti-intellectualism
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Reprint years 2017
DOI 10.1111/papq.12187
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References found in this work BETA

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