Rhizomata 5 (1):51-78 (2017)

Authors
Jason W. Carter
University of St. Andrews
Abstract
Of all the criticisms that Aristotle gives of his predecessors’ theories of soul in De anima I.3–5, none seems more unmotivated than the ones directed against the world soul of Plato’s Timaeus. Against the current scholarly consensus, I claim that the status of Aristotle’s criticisms is philosophical rather than eristical, and that they provide important philosophical reasons, independent of Phys. VIII.10 and Metaph. Λ.6, for believing that νοῦς is without spatial extension, and that its thinking is not a physical motion.
Keywords De anima  Plato  Timaeus  early Academy  extension  intellect  myth  nous  soul  thought  world soul
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DOI 10.1515/rhiz-2017-0003
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Aristotle's 'So-Called Elements'.Timothy Crowley - 2008 - Phronesis 53 (3):223-242.

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