In W. Carnielli L. Magnani (ed.), Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology. Springer. pp. 463--476 (2010)
Summary. The viability of the proposal that human cognition involves the utilization of nonsentential models is seriously undercut by the fact that no one has yet given a satisfactory account of how neurophysiological circuitry might realize representations of the right sort. Such an account is offered up here, the general idea behind which is that high-level models can be realized by lower—level computations and, in turn, by neural machinations. It is shown that this account can be usefully applied to deal with problems in fields ranging from artificial intelligence to the philosophy of science
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