Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):67-81 (2015)

Authors
Jennifer Rose Carr
University of California, San Diego
Abstract
Can we extend accuracy-based epistemic utility theory to imprecise credences? There's no obvious way of proceeding: some stipulations will be necessary for either (i) the notion of accuracy or (ii) the epistemic decision rule. With some prima facie plausible stipulations, imprecise credences are always required. With others, they’re always impermissible. Care is needed to reach the familiar evidential view of imprecise credence: that whether precise or imprecise credences are required depends on the character of one's evidence. I propose an epistemic utility theoretic defense of a common view about how evidence places demands on imprecise credence: that your spread of credence should cover the range of chance hypotheses left open by your evidence. I argue that objections to the form of epistemic utility theoretic argument that I use will extend to the standard motivation for epistemically mandatory imprecise credences.
Keywords epistemology  imprecise probability  accuracy  epistemic utility
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/phpe.12057
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,657
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
Reason and the Grain of Belief.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):139–165.
On Indeterminate Probabilities.Isaac Levi - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):391-418.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.
Imprecise Probabilities.Seamus Bradley - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Reliabilism and Imprecise Credences.Weng Hong Tang - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1463-1480.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

A Dilemma for the Imprecise Bayesian.Namjoong Kim - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1681-1702.
Vague Credence.Aidan Lyon - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):3931-3954.
Sleeping Beauty Should Be Imprecise.Daniel Jeremy Singer - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3159-3172.
Epistemic Conservativity and Imprecise Credence.Jason Konek - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Credal Dilemmas.Sarah Moss - 2014 - Noûs 48 (3):665-683.
The Principle of Indifference and Imprecise Probability.Susanna Rinard - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):110-114.
Against Radical Credal Imprecision.Susanna Rinard - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):157-165.
Scoring Imprecise Credences: A Mildly Immodest Proposal.Conor Mayo-Wilson & Gregory Wheeler - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):55-78.
Roger White’s Argument Against Imprecise Credences.Dylan Dodd - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):69-77.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-04-22

Total views
54 ( #201,797 of 2,462,324 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #223,344 of 2,462,324 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes