Southwest Philosophy Review 24 (1):219-231 (2008)

Authors
Gregg D. Caruso
Corning Community College
Abstract
One of the main libertarian arguments in support of free will is the argument from introspection. This argument places a great deal of faith in our conscious feeling of freedom and our introspective abilities. People often infer their own freedom from their introspective phenomenology of freedom. It is here argued that from the fact that I feel myself free, it does not necessarily follow that I am free. I maintain that it is our mistaken belief in the transparency and infallibility of consciousness that gives the introspective argument whatever power it possesses. Once we see that consciousness is neither transparent nor infallible, the argument from introspection loses all of its force. I argue that since we do not have direct, infallible access to our own minds, to rely on introspection to infer our own freedom would be a mistake.
Keywords Conference Proceedings  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0897-2346
DOI 10.5840/swphilreview200824138
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Free Will Eliminativism: Reference, Error, and Phenomenology.Gregg D. Caruso - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2823-2833.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Can We Know That We Have Free Will by Introspection?Keith Lehrer - 1960 - Journal of Philosophy 57 (March):145-156.
Introspection and Consciousness.Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.) - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
Introspection in Psychology and Philosophy.Jeffery L. Geller - 1987 - Philosophy Research Archives 13:471-480.
Introspection as a Method and Introspection as a Feature of Consciousness.Uljana Feest - 2012 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (1):1 - 16.
Introspection: Divided and Partly Eliminated.Peter Carruthers - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):76-111.
Introspective Humility.Tim Bayne & Maja Spener - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):1-22.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-02-06

Total views
2,346 ( #1,793 of 2,518,090 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
105 ( #6,744 of 2,518,090 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes