Authors
Erik Carlson
Uppsala Universitet
Jens Johansson
Uppsala University
Olle Risberg
Uppsala University
Abstract
A popular view of harming is the causal account (CA), on which harming is causing harm. CA has several attractive features. In particular, it appears well equipped to deal with the most important problems for its main competitor, the counterfactual comparative account (CCA). However, we argue that, despite its advantages, CA is ultimately an unacceptable theory of harming. Indeed, while CA avoids several counterexamples to CCA, it is vulnerable to close variants of some of the problems that beset CCA.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/papq.12390
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 63,247
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Can We Harm and Benefit in Creating?Elizabeth Harman - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):89–113.
Harm: Omission, Preemption, Freedom.Nathan Hanna - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):251-73.
Plural Harm.Neil Feit - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):361-388.
The Preemption Problem.Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):351-365.

View all 37 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

On the Strength of the Reason Against Harming.Molly Gardner - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (1):73-87.
Well-Being Counterfactualist Accounts of Harm and Benefit.Olle Risberg, Jens Johansson & Erik Carlson - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (1):164-174.
Abstract Versus Causal Explanations?Reutlinger Alexander & Andersen Holly - 2016 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 30 (2):129-146.
Understanding Science: Why Causes Are Not Enough.Ruth Berger - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (2):306-332.
The Normative Force of Reasoning.Ralph Wedgwood - 2006 - Noûs 40 (4):660–686.
Causal Network Accounts Of Ill-Being: Depression & Digital Well-Being.Nick Byrd - 2020 - In Christopher Burr & Luciano Floridi (eds.), Ethics of Digital Well-being: A Multidisciplinary Approach. Springer International Publishing. pp. 221-245.
The Veil of Perception.G. A. J. Rogers - 1975 - Mind 84 (April):210-224.
How Can Causal Explanations Explain?Jon Williamson - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (2):257-275.
Harming as Making Worse Off.Duncan Purves - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (10):2629-2656.
Can We Benefit in Non-Identity Cases?Charlotte Unruh - 2020 - Intergenerational Justice Review 5 (2):49-50.
Actual Causation.Enno Fischer - 2021 - Dissertation, Leibniz Universität Hannover

Analytics

Added to PP index
2021-09-23

Total views
10 ( #871,939 of 2,448,516 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #64,696 of 2,448,516 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes