Crenças justificadas não-inferencialmente e o mito do dado

Princípios 16 (25):231-263 (2009)

Authors
Eros Carvalho
Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to present an explanation of how the perceptualexperience fulfills its role of justification. The idea is that the perceptual experience justifiesnon-inferentially empirical beliefs in an internalist sense of justification. Against Sellars, I want to say that S relied on his experience to believe that the world is so and so. To discussthis question, I choose the arguments of Brewer and McDowell. Both argue that theexperience can justify beliefs, provided it has a conceptual content. But I will defend thatthere is no such need. The content can be non-conceptual and even then the experience can justify beliefs non-inferentially. I will try to explain how this is possible and at the end I willassess my approach in the face of Sellars' claim that empiricism assumes a triad of inconsistents thesis. I will recast these thesis in accordance with the approach defended and I will conclude that this present version of empiricism is free from Sellars's criticism.
Keywords Conceptualism  Foundationalism  Non-inferential Justification  Perception  The Myth of the Given
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