Counterexamples to principle beta: A response to Crisp and Warfield

The well-known "Consequence Argument" for the incompatibility of freedom and determinism relies on a certain rule of inference; "Principle Beta". Thomas Crisp and Ted Warfield have recently argued that all hitherto suggested counterexamples to Beta can be easily circumvented by proponents of the Consequence Argument. I present a new counterexample which, I argue, is free from the flaws Crisp and Warfield detect in earlier examples
Keywords Consequence  Determinism  Freedom  Metaphysics  Crisp, T  Warfield, T
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00287.x
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References found in this work BETA
An Essay on Free Will.Peter van Inwagen - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
The Irrelevance of Indeterministic Counterexamples to Principle Beta.Ted A. Warfield - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):173 - 184.
On the Transfer of Necessity.Timothy O'Connor - 1993 - Noûs 27 (2):204-18.

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