Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):76-111 (2010)
This paper will argue that there is no such thing as introspective access to judgments and decisions. It won't challenge the existence of introspective access to perceptual and imagistic states, nor to emotional feelings and bodily sensations. On the contrary, the model presented in Section 2 presumes such access. Hence introspection is here divided into two categories: introspection of propositional attitude events, on the one hand, and introspection of broadly perceptual events, on the other. I shall assume that the latter exists while arguing that the former doesn't (or not in the case of judgments and decisions, at least). Section 1 makes some preliminary points and distinctions, and outlines the scope of the argument. Section 2 presents and motivates the general model of introspection that predicts a divided result. Section 3 provides independent evidence for the conclusion that judgments and decisions aren't introspectable. Section 4 then replies to a number of objections to the argument, the most important of which is made from the perspective of so-called "dual systems theories" of belief formation and decision making. The upshot is a limited form of eliminativism about introspection, in respect of at least two core categories of propositional attitude
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References found in this work BETA
Mindreading. An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds.Shaun Nichols & Stephen P. Stich - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Citations of this work BETA
Thinking is Believing.Eric Mandelbaum - 2014 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):55-96.
Meta-Cognition in Animals: A Skeptical Look.Peter Carruthers - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (1):58–89.
Meta-Cognition in Animals: A Skeptical Look.Peter Carruthers - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (1):58–89.
The Apparent Illusion of Conscious Deciding.Joshua Shepherd - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):18 - 30.
The Neural Basis of Event-Time Introspection.Adrian G. Guggisberg, Sarang S. Dalal, Armin Schnider & Srikantan S. Nagarajan - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1899-1915.
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