Phronesis 63 (1):25-63 (2018)

Authors
Jason W. Carter
Oxford University
Abstract
In De Anima 1.4, Aristotle asks whether the soul can be moved by its own affections. His conclusion—that to say the soul grows angry is like saying that it weaves and builds—has traditionally been read on the assumption that it is false to credit the soul with weaving and building; I argue that Aristotle’s analysis of psychological motions implies his belief that the soul does in fact weave and build.
Keywords Aristotle   affections   agency   craft analogy   motion   predication   subject  soul
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DOI 10.1163/15685284-12341341
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References found in this work BETA

Aristotle's First Principles.Terence Irwin - 1988 - Oxford University Press.
Aristotle's First Principles.Gisela Striker - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (9):489-496.

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Aristotle on Attention.Elena Cagnoli Fiecconi - forthcoming - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.

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