Religious Studies 48 (4):445 - 468 (2012)
AbstractA well-known objection to divine will/divine command moral theories is that they commit us to the view that God's will is arbitrary. I argue that several versions of divine will/divine command moral theories, including two of Robert Adams's versions of the DCT and my own divine preference theory, can be successfully defended against this objection. I argue that, even if God's preferences are somewhat arbitrary, we have reasons to conform our wills to them. It is not a fatal objection to divine will/divine command moral theories if they imply that God's will/God's commands is/are arbitrary, to some extent
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The Nature of Existence.John Mctaggart, Ellis Mctaggart & C. D. Broad - 1928 - Mind 37 (146):221-233.