Epistemic Autonomy and Externalism

In Kirk Lougheed & Jonathan Matheson (eds.), Epistemic Autonomy. London: Routledge (2020)
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Abstract

The philosophical significance of attitudinal autonomy—viz., the autonomy of attitudes such as beliefs—is widely discussed in the literature on moral responsibility and free will. Within this literature, a key debate centres around the following question: is the kind of attitudinal autonomy that’s relevant to moral responsibility at a given time determined entirely by a subject’s present mental structure at that time? Internalists say ‘yes’, externalists say ’no’. In this essay, I motivate a kind of distinctly epistemic attitudinal autonomy, attitudinal autonomy that is relevant to knowledge. I argue that regardless of whether we are externalists or internalists about the kind of attitudinal autonomy that is relevant for moral responsibility, we should be externalists about the kind of autonomy that a belief must have to qualify as knowledge.

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2020-06-30

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J. Adam Carter
University of Glasgow

Citations of this work

Do your own research!Neil Levy - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-19.
Autonomy as Practical Understanding.Reza Hadisi - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
Spotting When Algorithms Are Wrong.Stefan Buijsman & Herman Veluwenkamp - 2023 - Minds and Machines 33 (4):541-562.

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References found in this work

Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Mark Ravizza.
Knowledge in a social world.Alvin I. Goldman - 1991 - New York: Oxford University Press.
A virtue epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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