Epistemic and Deontic Should

Abstract
Probabilistic theories of “should” and “ought” face a predicament. At first blush, it seems that such theories must provide different lexical entries for the epistemic and the deontic interpretations of these modals. I show that there is a new style of premise semantics that can avoid this consequence in an attractively conservative way.
Keywords relevant alternatives  premise semantics  deontic modals  probability  epistemic modals
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DOI 10.1002/tht3.61
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Modals.Seth Yalcin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):983-1026.
Ifs and Oughts.Niko Kolodny & John MacFarlane - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (3):115-143.
Agency and Deontic Logic.John F. Horty - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
What We Know and What to Do.Nate Charlow - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2291-2323.

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Citations of this work BETA
Advice for Noncognitivists.Malte Willer - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):174–207.

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