Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):73-84 (2013)
Probabilistic theories of “should” and “ought” face a predicament. At first blush, it seems that such theories must provide different lexical entries for the epistemic and the deontic interpretations of these modals. I show that there is a new style of premise semantics that can avoid this consequence in an attractively conservative way.
|Keywords||relevant alternatives premise semantics deontic modals probability epistemic modals|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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