Res Philosophica 92 (2):217-236 (2015)

Authors
Jennifer Rose Carr
University of California, San Diego
Abstract
Epistemology should take seriously the possibility of rationally evaluable changes in conceptual resources. Epistemic decision theory compares belief states in terms of epistemic value. But it's standardly restricted to belief states that don't differ in their conceptual resources. I argue that epistemic decision theory should be generalized to make belief states with differing concepts comparable. I characterize some possible constraints on epistemic utility functions. Traditionally, the epistemic utility of a total belief state has been understood as a function of the epistemic utility of individual (partial) beliefs. The most natural ways of generalizing this account generate a kind of repugnant conclusion. I characterize some possible alternatives, reflecting different epistemic norms.
Keywords transformative experiences  epistemic utility  accuracy  epistemology
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DOI 10.11612/resphil.2015.92.2.4
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Laws and Symmetry.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1989 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Transformative Experience.L. A. Paul - 2014 - Oxford University Press.

View all 20 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Who Cares What You Accurately Believe?Clayton Littlejohn - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):217-248.
Transformative Choice: Discussion and Replies.L. A. Paul - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (2):473-545.
Repugnant Accuracy.Brian Talbot - 2019 - Noûs 53 (3):540-563.

View all 14 citations / Add more citations

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