First persons: On Richard Moran's authority and estrangement

Richard Moran's Authority and Estrangement offers a subtle and innovative account of self-knowledge that lifts the problem out of the narrow confines of epistemology and into the broader context of practical reasoning and moral psychology. Moran argues convincingly that fundamental self/other asymmetries are essential to our concept of persons. Moreover, the first- and the third-person points of view are systematically interconnected, so that the expression or avowal of one's attitudes constitutes a substantive form of self-knowledge. But while Moran's argument is wide-ranging and compelling, he relies throughout on an overly intellectualized conception of first-person attitudes as attitudes of reflection or deliberation. That conception is at once implausible and unnecessary to the main current of his argument, whose goal is to demonstrate that our self-conception as persons depends on both the distinctness and the interconnectedness of our first- and third-person perspectives on ourselves.
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DOI 10.1080/00201740310002424
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References found in this work BETA
Practical Reasoning.Barry Stroud - 2000 - In Edna Ullmann-Margalit (ed.), Reasoning Practically. Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Delusional Beliefs and Reason Giving.Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):801-21.
Two Objections to Moran's Transparency Account.Julie Germein - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (5):735-740.
Transparência, reflexão e vicissitude.Waldomiro J. Silva Filho - 2011 - Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia 52 (123):213-236.

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