Mind:1-28 (2022)

Authors
Sam Carter
Australian Catholic University
Simon Goldstein
Australian Catholic University
Abstract
There is a large literature exploring how accuracy constrains rational degrees of belief. This paper turns to the unexplored question of how accuracy constrains knowledge. We begin by introducing a simple hypothesis: increases in the accuracy of an agent’s evidence never lead to decreases in what the agent knows. We explore various precise formulations of this principle, consider arguments in its favor, and explain how it interacts with different conceptions of evidence and accuracy. As we show, the principle has some noteworthy consequences for the wider theory of knowledge. First, it implies that an agent cannot be justified in believing a set of mutually inconsistent claims. Second, it implies the existence of a kind of epistemic blindspot: it is not possible to know that one’s evidence is misleading.
Keywords Knowledge  Accuracy  Skepticism  Verisimilitude  Probability  Justification  Skepticism  Normality
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/mind/fzac009
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
The Contents of Visual Experience.Susanna Siegel - 2010 - Oxford University Press USA.
Knowledge in an Uncertain World.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

View all 101 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Disagreement, Skepticism, and the Dialectical Conception of Justification.Markus Lammenranta - 2011 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1 (1):3-17.
Knowledge and Skepticism. [REVIEW]John Turri - 2011 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1 (2):155-157.
Critical Notice: The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism.Bredo Johnsen - 2011 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1 (1):56-67.
Skepticism.P. Klein - 2002 - In P. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
The normality of error.Sam Carter & Simon Goldstein - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2509-2533.
Meta-Skepticism.David Pérez Chico & Vicente Sanfélix Vidarte - 2019 - Estudios de Filosofía (Universidad de Antioquia) 60.
Skepticism and Contextualism.Michael Hannon - 2017 - In Jonathan Ichikawa (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Routledge. pp. 131--144.
Rational Resistance to Skepticism.Wai-Hung Wong - 2001 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley

Analytics

Added to PP index
2022-06-16

Total views
192 ( #61,828 of 2,518,734 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
192 ( #2,800 of 2,518,734 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes