Human Foreknowledge

Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):50-69 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I explore the motivation and logical consequences of the idea that we have some (limited) ability to know contingent facts about the future, even in presence of the assumption that the future is objectively unsettled or indeterminate. I start by formally characterizing skepticism about the future. This analysis nudges the anti-skeptic towards the idea that if some propositions about the future are objectively indeterminate, then it may be indeterminate whether a suitably positioned agent knows them. Philosophical Perspectives, Volume 35, Issue 1, Page 50-69, December 2021.

Similar books and articles

The open future, bivalence and assertion.Corine Besson & Anandi Hattiangadi - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):251-271.
Knowing Future Contingents.Ezio Di Nucci - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (1):43-50.
Assertion and the Future.Corine Besson & Anandi Hattiangadi - 2018 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-504.
Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom. [REVIEW]Gary Mar - 1992 - Review of Metaphysics 45 (3):606-607.
Some Problems with the Russellian Open Future.Jacek Wawer - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (4):413-425.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-03-19

Downloads
814 (#17,364)

6 months
131 (#22,867)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Fabrizio Cariani
University of Maryland, College Park

References found in this work

Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Logic and Conversation.H. Paul Grice - 1975 - In Maite Ezcurdia & Robert J. Stainton (eds.), The Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary in Philosophy. Broadview Press. pp. 47.
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.Edward N. Zalta (ed.) - 2014 - Stanford, CA: The Metaphysics Research Lab.

View all 57 references / Add more references