How not to Preserve Kripke's Fundamental Insight

Kripke´s work on names and identity continues to be subject of intense critical scrutiny. The Kripkean message, briefly statet, is that names are rigid designators and that identy statements formulated in terms of names are, if true, necessarily true. Recently Micheal Jubien developes a revisionist line that denies that names serve a referential role but allows, nonetheless, that Kripke´s fundamental insight can be preserved. In my paper, I critically examine Jubien´s proposal for preserving the Kripkean insight that "deserves to be preserved"
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